Amendments 11-27 REVIEW
1 Abolished slavery
2 Gave women the right to vote
3 Limits the Pres to two terms or 10 years
4 Banned alcohol (Prohibition)
5 Give citizens the right to directly elect their own Senators
(Before this amendment, Senators were appointed )
6 Lowered the voting age to 18
Was passed as a result of the Vietnam War
7 States the requirements for citizenship & guarantees US citizenship rights
8 Banned poll taxes
Passed to try and end the Jim Crow law of forcing voters to pay a tax
9 Protects U.S. citizens from lawsuits from other states & countries
10 Granted the right to vote to all male citizens
Voting rights cannot be denied because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude
11 Gave Congress the power to tax income
12 Moved the inauguration date to Jan. 20
13 Allows D.C. residents to vote in Presidential elections
Guarantees that all states and D.C. get 3 electoral votes
14 Fixed the electoral college system by having the electors indicate who they were voting for Pres & for VP
15 Canceled the 18th Amend
16 Established the procedures for replacing a Pres
17 Limits Congress’ power to give itself raises by forcing them to wait until after the next election before they can receive them!
Court cases by amendment
Board of Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
01-332 Argued: March 19, 2002 --- Decided: June 27, 2002
The Student Activities Drug Testing Policy (Policy) adopted by the Tecumseh, Oklahoma, School District (School District) requires all middle and high school students to consent to urinalysis testing for drugs in order to participate in any extracurricular activity. In practice, the Policy has been applied only to competitive extracurricular activities sanctioned by the Oklahoma Secondary Schools Activities Association (OSSAA). Respondent high school students and their parents brought this 42 U.S. C. §1983 action for equitable relief, alleging that the Policy violates the Fourth Amendment. Applying Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, in which this Court upheld the suspicionless drug testing of school athletes, the District Court granted the School District summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the Policy violated the Fourth Amendment. It concluded that before imposing a suspicionless drug testing program a school must demonstrate some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those tested, such that testing that group will actually redress its drug problem. The court then held that the School District had failed to demonstrate such a problem among Tecumseh students participating in competitive extracurricular activities.
Stanford v. Kentucky (No. 87-5765)
Argued: March 27, 1989
Decided: June 26, 1989 [*]
Syllabus
Petitioner in No. 87-5765 was approximately 17 years and 4 months old at the time he committed murder in Kentucky. A juvenile court, after conducting hearings, transferred him for trial as an adult under a state statute permitting such action as to offenders who are either charged with a Class A felony or capital crime or who are over the age of 16 and charged with a felony. Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death. The State Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence, rejecting petitioner's contention that he had a constitutional right to treatment in the juvenile justice system, and declaring that his age and the possibility that he might be rehabilitated were mitigating factors properly left to the jury. Petitioner in No. 87-6026, who was approximately 16 years and 6 months old when he committed murder in Missouri, was certified for trial as an adult under a state statute permitting such action against individuals between 14 and 17 years old who have committed felonies. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death. The State Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting his contention that the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.
Whitley v. Albers (No. 84-1077)
Argued: December 10, 1985
Decided: March 4, 1986
Syllabus
During the course of a riot at the Oregon State Penitentiary, a prison officer was taken hostage and placed in a cell on the upper tier of a two-tier cellblock. In an attempt to free the hostage, prison officials worked out a plan that called for the prisoner security manager to enter the cellblock unarmed, followed by prison officers armed with shotguns. The security manager ordered one of the officers to fire a warning shot and to shoot low at any inmates climbing the stairs to the upper tier, since he would be climbing the stairs to free the hostage. One of the officers, after firing a warning shot, shot respondent in the left knee when he started up the stairs. Respondent subsequently brought an action in Federal District Court against petitioner prison officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging, inter alia, that they had deprived him of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. At the conclusion of the trial, the District Court directed a verdict for petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial on respondent's Eighth Amendment claim.
Lee v. Weisman
505 U.S. 577
Lee v. Weisman (No. 90-1014)
Argued: Nov. 6, 1991
Decided: June 24, 1992
Syllabus
Principals of public middle and high schools in Providence, Rhode Island, are permitted to invite members of the clergy to give invocations and benedictions at their schools' graduation ceremonies. Petitioner Lee, a middle school principal, invited a rabbi to offer such prayers at the graduation ceremony for Deborah Weisman's class, gave the Rabbi a pamphlet containing guidelines for the composition of public prayers at civic ceremonies, and advised him that the prayers should be nonsectarian. Shortly before the ceremony, the District Court denied the motion of respondent Weisman, Deborah's father, for a temporary restraining order to prohibit school officials from including the prayers in the ceremony. Deborah and her family attended the ceremony, and the prayers were recited. Subsequently, Weisman sought a permanent injunction barring Lee and other petitioners, various Providence public school officials, from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at future graduations. It appears likely that such prayers will be conducted at Deborah's high school graduation. The District Court enjoined petitioners from continuing the practice at issue on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
United States v. Eichman ()
Argued: May 14, 1990
Decided: June 11, 1990
No. 89-1433, 731 F.Supp. 1123 (DDC 1990); No. 89-1434, 731 F.Supp. 415, affirmed.
· Syllabus
· Opinion, Brennan
· Dissent, Stevens
Syllabus
After this Court held, in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, that a Texas statute criminalizing desecration of the United States flag in a way that the actor knew would seriously offend onlookers was unconstitutional as applied to an individual who had burned a flag during a political protest, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act of 1989. The Act criminalizes the conduct of anyone who "knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon" a United States flag, except conduct related to the disposal of a "worn or soiled" flag. Subsequently, appellees were prosecuted in the District Courts for violating the Act: some for knowingly burning several flags while protesting various aspects of the Government's policies and others, in a separate incident, for knowingly burning a flag while protesting the Act's passage. In each case, appellees moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that the Act violates the First Amendment. Both District Courts, following Johnson, supra, held the Act unconstitutional as applied, and dismissed the charges.
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins (No. 79-289)
Argued: March 18, 1980
Decided: June 9, 1980
23 Cal.3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, affirmed.
Syllabus
Soon after appellees had begun soliciting in appellant privately owned shopping center's central courtyard for signatures from passersby for petitions in opposition to a United Nations resolution, a security guard informed appellees that they would have to leave because their activity violated shopping center regulations prohibiting any visitor or tenant from engaging in any publicly expressive activity that is not directly related to the center's commercial purposes. Appellees immediately left the premises and later filed suit in a California state court to enjoin the shopping center and its owner (also an appellant) from denying appellees access to the center for the purpose of circulating their petitions. The trial court held that appellees were not entitled under either the Federal or California Constitution to exercise their asserted rights on the shopping center property, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the California Constitution protects speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the center is privately owned, and that such result does not infringe appellants' property rights protected by the Federal Constitution.
Griswold v. Connecticut (No. 496)
Argued: March 29-30, 1965
Decided: June 7, 1965
Syllabus
Appellants, the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and its medical director, a licensed physician, were convicted as accessories for giving married persons information and medical advice on how to prevent conception and, following examination, prescribing a contraceptive device or material for the wife's use. A Connecticut statute makes it a crime for any person to use any drug or article to prevent conception. Appellants claimed that the accessory statute, as applied, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. An intermediate appellate court and the State's highest court affirmed the judgment.
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
517 U.S. 559
v. Gore (No. 94-896)
Argued: October 11, 1995
Decided: May 20, 1996
Syllabus
After respondent Gore purchased a new BMW automobile from an authorized Alabama dealer, he discovered that the car had been repainted. He brought this suit for compensatory and punitive damages against petitioner, the American distributor of BMW's, alleging, inter alia, that the failure to disclose the repainting constituted fraud under Alabama law. At trial, BMW acknowledged that it followed a nationwide policy of not advising its dealers, and hence their customers, of predelivery damage to new cars when the cost of repair did not exceed 3 percent of the car's suggested retail price. Gore's vehicle fell into that category. The jury returned a verdict finding BMW liable for compensatory damages of $4,000, and assessing $4 million in punitive damages. The trial judge denied BMW's post-trial motion to set aside the punitive damages award, holding, among other things, that the award was not “grossly excessive” and thus did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454. The Alabama Supreme Court agreed, but reduced the award to $2 million on the ground that, in computing the amount, the jury had improperly multiplied Gore's compensatory damages by the number of similar sales in all States, not just those in Alabama.
Escobedo v. Illinois (No. 615)
Decided: June 22, 1964
Syllabus
Petitioner, a 22-year-old of Mexican extraction, was arrested with his sister and taken to police headquarters for interrogation in connection with the fatal shooting, about 11 days before, of his brother-in-law. He had been arrested shortly after the shooting, but had made no statement, and was released after his lawyer obtained a writ of habeas corpus from a state court. Petitioner made several requests to see his lawyer, who, though present in the building, and despite persistent efforts, was refused access to his client. Petitioner was not advised by the police of his right to remain silent and, after persistent questioning by the police, made a damaging statement to an Assistant State's Attorney which was admitted at the trial. Convicted of murder, he appealed to the State Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction.
Pointer v. Texas (No. 577)
Decided: April 5, 1965
Syllabus
Petitioner was arrested and brought before a state judge for preliminary hearing on a robbery charge. The complaining witness testified but petitioner, who had no counsel, did not cross-examine. Petitioner was later indicted and tried. The witness had moved to another State, and the transcript of his testimony at the hearing was introduced over petitioner's objections that he was denied the right of confrontation. He was convicted and the highest state court affirmed.
Waller v. Florida (No. 24)
Argued: November 13, 1969
Decided: April 6, 1970
___
Syllabus
Petitioner was convicted by the St. Petersburg municipal court of violating two ordinances, destruction of city property and disorderly breach of the peace, and sentenced to 180 days in jail. Thereafter, an information, concededly based on the same acts that led to the previous convictions, was filed by the State of Florida charging petitioner with grand larceny. The State Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition to prevent the second trial on petitioner's claim of double jeopardy. Petitioner was tried and convicted of grand larceny. The District Court of Appeal, holding that there would be no bar to the prosecution in the state court. "even if a person has been tried in a municipal court for the identical offense with which he is charged in a state court," affirmed the grand larceny conviction.
1 Abolished slavery
2 Gave women the right to vote
3 Limits the Pres to two terms or 10 years
4 Banned alcohol (Prohibition)
5 Give citizens the right to directly elect their own Senators
(Before this amendment, Senators were appointed )
6 Lowered the voting age to 18
Was passed as a result of the Vietnam War
7 States the requirements for citizenship & guarantees US citizenship rights
8 Banned poll taxes
Passed to try and end the Jim Crow law of forcing voters to pay a tax
9 Protects U.S. citizens from lawsuits from other states & countries
10 Granted the right to vote to all male citizens
Voting rights cannot be denied because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude
11 Gave Congress the power to tax income
12 Moved the inauguration date to Jan. 20
13 Allows D.C. residents to vote in Presidential elections
Guarantees that all states and D.C. get 3 electoral votes
14 Fixed the electoral college system by having the electors indicate who they were voting for Pres & for VP
15 Canceled the 18th Amend
16 Established the procedures for replacing a Pres
17 Limits Congress’ power to give itself raises by forcing them to wait until after the next election before they can receive them!
Court cases by amendment
Board of Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
01-332 Argued: March 19, 2002 --- Decided: June 27, 2002
The Student Activities Drug Testing Policy (Policy) adopted by the Tecumseh, Oklahoma, School District (School District) requires all middle and high school students to consent to urinalysis testing for drugs in order to participate in any extracurricular activity. In practice, the Policy has been applied only to competitive extracurricular activities sanctioned by the Oklahoma Secondary Schools Activities Association (OSSAA). Respondent high school students and their parents brought this 42 U.S. C. §1983 action for equitable relief, alleging that the Policy violates the Fourth Amendment. Applying Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, in which this Court upheld the suspicionless drug testing of school athletes, the District Court granted the School District summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the Policy violated the Fourth Amendment. It concluded that before imposing a suspicionless drug testing program a school must demonstrate some identifiable drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those tested, such that testing that group will actually redress its drug problem. The court then held that the School District had failed to demonstrate such a problem among Tecumseh students participating in competitive extracurricular activities.
Stanford v. Kentucky (No. 87-5765)
Argued: March 27, 1989
Decided: June 26, 1989 [*]
Syllabus
Petitioner in No. 87-5765 was approximately 17 years and 4 months old at the time he committed murder in Kentucky. A juvenile court, after conducting hearings, transferred him for trial as an adult under a state statute permitting such action as to offenders who are either charged with a Class A felony or capital crime or who are over the age of 16 and charged with a felony. Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death. The State Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence, rejecting petitioner's contention that he had a constitutional right to treatment in the juvenile justice system, and declaring that his age and the possibility that he might be rehabilitated were mitigating factors properly left to the jury. Petitioner in No. 87-6026, who was approximately 16 years and 6 months old when he committed murder in Missouri, was certified for trial as an adult under a state statute permitting such action against individuals between 14 and 17 years old who have committed felonies. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death. The State Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting his contention that the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.
Whitley v. Albers (No. 84-1077)
Argued: December 10, 1985
Decided: March 4, 1986
Syllabus
During the course of a riot at the Oregon State Penitentiary, a prison officer was taken hostage and placed in a cell on the upper tier of a two-tier cellblock. In an attempt to free the hostage, prison officials worked out a plan that called for the prisoner security manager to enter the cellblock unarmed, followed by prison officers armed with shotguns. The security manager ordered one of the officers to fire a warning shot and to shoot low at any inmates climbing the stairs to the upper tier, since he would be climbing the stairs to free the hostage. One of the officers, after firing a warning shot, shot respondent in the left knee when he started up the stairs. Respondent subsequently brought an action in Federal District Court against petitioner prison officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging, inter alia, that they had deprived him of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. At the conclusion of the trial, the District Court directed a verdict for petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial on respondent's Eighth Amendment claim.
Lee v. Weisman
505 U.S. 577
Lee v. Weisman (No. 90-1014)
Argued: Nov. 6, 1991
Decided: June 24, 1992
Syllabus
Principals of public middle and high schools in Providence, Rhode Island, are permitted to invite members of the clergy to give invocations and benedictions at their schools' graduation ceremonies. Petitioner Lee, a middle school principal, invited a rabbi to offer such prayers at the graduation ceremony for Deborah Weisman's class, gave the Rabbi a pamphlet containing guidelines for the composition of public prayers at civic ceremonies, and advised him that the prayers should be nonsectarian. Shortly before the ceremony, the District Court denied the motion of respondent Weisman, Deborah's father, for a temporary restraining order to prohibit school officials from including the prayers in the ceremony. Deborah and her family attended the ceremony, and the prayers were recited. Subsequently, Weisman sought a permanent injunction barring Lee and other petitioners, various Providence public school officials, from inviting clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at future graduations. It appears likely that such prayers will be conducted at Deborah's high school graduation. The District Court enjoined petitioners from continuing the practice at issue on the ground that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
United States v. Eichman ()
Argued: May 14, 1990
Decided: June 11, 1990
No. 89-1433, 731 F.Supp. 1123 (DDC 1990); No. 89-1434, 731 F.Supp. 415, affirmed.
· Syllabus
· Opinion, Brennan
· Dissent, Stevens
Syllabus
After this Court held, in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, that a Texas statute criminalizing desecration of the United States flag in a way that the actor knew would seriously offend onlookers was unconstitutional as applied to an individual who had burned a flag during a political protest, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act of 1989. The Act criminalizes the conduct of anyone who "knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon" a United States flag, except conduct related to the disposal of a "worn or soiled" flag. Subsequently, appellees were prosecuted in the District Courts for violating the Act: some for knowingly burning several flags while protesting various aspects of the Government's policies and others, in a separate incident, for knowingly burning a flag while protesting the Act's passage. In each case, appellees moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that the Act violates the First Amendment. Both District Courts, following Johnson, supra, held the Act unconstitutional as applied, and dismissed the charges.
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins (No. 79-289)
Argued: March 18, 1980
Decided: June 9, 1980
23 Cal.3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, affirmed.
Syllabus
Soon after appellees had begun soliciting in appellant privately owned shopping center's central courtyard for signatures from passersby for petitions in opposition to a United Nations resolution, a security guard informed appellees that they would have to leave because their activity violated shopping center regulations prohibiting any visitor or tenant from engaging in any publicly expressive activity that is not directly related to the center's commercial purposes. Appellees immediately left the premises and later filed suit in a California state court to enjoin the shopping center and its owner (also an appellant) from denying appellees access to the center for the purpose of circulating their petitions. The trial court held that appellees were not entitled under either the Federal or California Constitution to exercise their asserted rights on the shopping center property, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the California Constitution protects speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the center is privately owned, and that such result does not infringe appellants' property rights protected by the Federal Constitution.
Griswold v. Connecticut (No. 496)
Argued: March 29-30, 1965
Decided: June 7, 1965
Syllabus
Appellants, the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and its medical director, a licensed physician, were convicted as accessories for giving married persons information and medical advice on how to prevent conception and, following examination, prescribing a contraceptive device or material for the wife's use. A Connecticut statute makes it a crime for any person to use any drug or article to prevent conception. Appellants claimed that the accessory statute, as applied, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. An intermediate appellate court and the State's highest court affirmed the judgment.
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
517 U.S. 559
v. Gore (No. 94-896)
Argued: October 11, 1995
Decided: May 20, 1996
Syllabus
After respondent Gore purchased a new BMW automobile from an authorized Alabama dealer, he discovered that the car had been repainted. He brought this suit for compensatory and punitive damages against petitioner, the American distributor of BMW's, alleging, inter alia, that the failure to disclose the repainting constituted fraud under Alabama law. At trial, BMW acknowledged that it followed a nationwide policy of not advising its dealers, and hence their customers, of predelivery damage to new cars when the cost of repair did not exceed 3 percent of the car's suggested retail price. Gore's vehicle fell into that category. The jury returned a verdict finding BMW liable for compensatory damages of $4,000, and assessing $4 million in punitive damages. The trial judge denied BMW's post-trial motion to set aside the punitive damages award, holding, among other things, that the award was not “grossly excessive” and thus did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454. The Alabama Supreme Court agreed, but reduced the award to $2 million on the ground that, in computing the amount, the jury had improperly multiplied Gore's compensatory damages by the number of similar sales in all States, not just those in Alabama.
Escobedo v. Illinois (No. 615)
Decided: June 22, 1964
Syllabus
Petitioner, a 22-year-old of Mexican extraction, was arrested with his sister and taken to police headquarters for interrogation in connection with the fatal shooting, about 11 days before, of his brother-in-law. He had been arrested shortly after the shooting, but had made no statement, and was released after his lawyer obtained a writ of habeas corpus from a state court. Petitioner made several requests to see his lawyer, who, though present in the building, and despite persistent efforts, was refused access to his client. Petitioner was not advised by the police of his right to remain silent and, after persistent questioning by the police, made a damaging statement to an Assistant State's Attorney which was admitted at the trial. Convicted of murder, he appealed to the State Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction.
Pointer v. Texas (No. 577)
Decided: April 5, 1965
Syllabus
Petitioner was arrested and brought before a state judge for preliminary hearing on a robbery charge. The complaining witness testified but petitioner, who had no counsel, did not cross-examine. Petitioner was later indicted and tried. The witness had moved to another State, and the transcript of his testimony at the hearing was introduced over petitioner's objections that he was denied the right of confrontation. He was convicted and the highest state court affirmed.
Waller v. Florida (No. 24)
Argued: November 13, 1969
Decided: April 6, 1970
___
Syllabus
Petitioner was convicted by the St. Petersburg municipal court of violating two ordinances, destruction of city property and disorderly breach of the peace, and sentenced to 180 days in jail. Thereafter, an information, concededly based on the same acts that led to the previous convictions, was filed by the State of Florida charging petitioner with grand larceny. The State Supreme Court denied a writ of prohibition to prevent the second trial on petitioner's claim of double jeopardy. Petitioner was tried and convicted of grand larceny. The District Court of Appeal, holding that there would be no bar to the prosecution in the state court. "even if a person has been tried in a municipal court for the identical offense with which he is charged in a state court," affirmed the grand larceny conviction.