Supreme Court Cases Every Teen Should Know: Part 2
More of the Court's most important rulings on freedom of speech and privacy at school, and other issues affecting teenagers.
By Tom Jacobs
Part 1 of this article (Upfront, Sept. 3, 2007) addressed five Supreme Court cases dealing with issues both in and out of the classroom, including students' right to protest, school prayer, and how the legal system treats teenagers. Part 2 looks at five more key cases, involving student newspapers, drug testing of athletes, after-school clubs, the use of race in college admissions, and whether children have constitutional protections at home.
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (1988)
Issue: Student Journalism and the First Amendment
Bottom Line: Schools Can Censor Student Newspapers
Background
Cathy Kuhlmeier, Leslie Smart, and Leanne Tippett, juniors at Hazelwood East High School in St. Louis, Missouri, helped write and edit the school paper, the Spectrum, as part of a journalism class. An issue of the paper was to include articles about the impact of divorce on students and teen pregnancy. The school's principal refused to publish the two stories, saying they were too sensitive for younger students and contained too many personal details. The girls went to court claiming their First Amendment right to freedom of expression had been violated.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled against the girls. A school newspaper isn't a public forum in which anyone can voice an opinion, the Court said, but rather a supervised learning experience for students interested in journalism. "Educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities," the Court said, "so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate [educational] concerns."
Impact
Schools may censor newspapers and restrict other forms of student expression, including theatrical productions, yearbooks, creative writing assignments, and campaign and graduation speeches. But the Court's ruling in Hazelwood encourages schools to look closely at a student activity before imposing any restrictions and to balance the goal of maintaining high standards for student speech with students' right to free expression.
Vernonia School District v. Acton (1995)
Issue: Student Athletes and Drug Testing
Bottom Line: Schools Can Require It
Background
James Acton, a 12-year-old seventh-grader at Washington Grade School in Vernonia, Oregon, wanted to try out for the football team. His school required all student athletes to take drug tests at the beginning of the season and on a random basis during the school year. James's parents refused to let him be tested because, they said, there was no evidence that he used drugs or alcohol. The school suspended James from sports for the season. He and his parents sued the school district, arguing that mandatory drug testing without suspicion of illegal activity constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the school district. Schools must balance students' right to privacy against the need to make school campuses safe and keep student athletes away from drugs, the Court said. The drug-testing policy, which required students to provide a urine sample, involved only a limited invasion of privacy, according to the Justices: "Students who voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy."
The Court noted that all students surrender some privacy rights while at school: They must follow school rules and submit to school discipline. But student athletes have even fewer privacy rights, the Justices said, and must follow rules that don't apply to other students. Joining a team usually requires getting a physical exam, obtaining insurance coverage, and maintaining a minimum grade point average. And athletes must be willing to shower and change in locker rooms, further reducing their privacy. "School sports are not for the bashful," the Court said.
Impact
More recently, the Court has ruled in favor of school policies requiring random drug testing for all extracurricular activities (Board of Education v. Earls, 2002).
West Side Community Schools v. Mergens (1990) Issue: Student Clubs
Bottom Line: Public Schools That Allow Student-interest Clubs Cannot Exclude Religious or political ones
Background
Bridget Mergens was a senior at Westside High School in Omaha, Nebraska. She asked her homeroom teacher, who was also the school's principal, for permission to start an after-school Christian club. Westside High already had about 30 clubs, including a chess club and a scuba-diving club. The principal denied Bridget's request, telling her that a religious club would be illegal in a public school.
The year before, in 1984, Congress had addressed this issue in the Equal Access Act, which required public schools to allow religious and political clubs if they let students form other kinds of student-interest clubs. When Bridget challenged the principal's decision, her lawsuit became the Supreme Court's test case for deciding whether the Equal Access Act was constitutional under what is known as the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Bridget. Allowing students to meet on campus to discuss religion after school did not amount to state sponsorship of religion, the Court said: "We think that secondary-school students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits."
Impact
If a public school allows only clubs tied to the school curriculum—a French club related to French classes, for instance—it can exclude clubs that don't connect to its educational mission. But once a school allows student-interest clubs—such as a scuba-diving club, environmental club, or jazz club—it cannot exclude religious clubs, political clubs, gay-lesbian clubs, or other groups.
If the club is religious in nature, however, the school must refrain from active involvement or sponsorship, so that it doesn't run afoul of the Establishment Clause, the Court said.
Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)
Issue: Affirmative Action in College
Bottom Line: Colleges Can Use Race as a Factor in Admissions
Background
In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white Michigan resident, was denied admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter, who had a 3.8 undergraduate grade point average and good standardized test scores, sued the university over the law school's affirmative action policy, which considered race as a factor in admissions. Michigan and many other universities use affirmative action to increase the number of minority students admitted. Grutter claimed that Michigan admitted less-qualified minority applicants in violation of federal civil rights laws and the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees citizens "equal protection" under the law.
Ruling
The Supreme Court upheld the use of affirmative action in higher education. "Student-body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions," the Court said. But the Court emphasized that the University of Michigan's policy was acceptable because the school conducted a thorough review of each applicant's qualifications and did not use a racial quota system—meaning it did not set aside a specific number of offers for minority applicants.
Impact
Affirmative action, which has its origins in a 1961 executive order issued by President John F. Kennedy, continues to be a contentious issue, with critics charging that it amounts to reverse discrimination. Since 1996, voters in three states—California, Washington, and, most recently, Michigan—have approved laws banning affirmative action in public education, in state government hiring, and the awarding of state contracts. (At Upfrontmagazine.com: a look at the Court's decision in June limiting the use of race in public school integration plans.)
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social Services (1989)
Issue: Constitutional Rights at Home
Bottom Line: The Constitution Doesn't Protect Kids from Their Parents
Background
Four-year-old Joshua DeShaney lived with his father, who physically abused him, in Neenah, Wisconsin. At one point, the State Department of Social Services took custody of Joshua but returned him after three days. Later, Joshua was hospitalized with bruises all over his body and severe brain damage. He survived, but was permanently paralyzed and mentally disabled. His father was convicted of child abuse and sent to prison. Joshua's mother sued the Department of Social Services for returning him to his father. She argued that the department had a duty to protect her son under the Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids the state from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
Ruling
The Court ruled against Joshua and his mother. It said essentially that the Constitution does not protect children from their parents and that therefore the government was not at fault in Joshua's abuse.
Impact
The Supreme Court has consistently respected parents' rights to discipline their children. But even though the government isn't required under the Constitution to protect children, all states assume this responsibility through child protection laws. The Supreme Court has generally deferred to state and local governments to enforce these laws and to intervene in cases of mistreatment.
WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN? Equal Rights & Treatment
1. Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857)
Dred Scott was born a slave in Virginia around 1799. In 1834, a man named Dr. Emerson bought Dred Scott and they moved to Illinois, a non-slave (free) state. In 1836, they moved to Minnesota, also a non-slave state. In 1838, the Emersons and Scott moved to Missouri, a slave state.
In 1843, Dr. Emerson died, leaving his wife possession of Scott. Dred Scott sued Mrs. Emerson. He claimed that he was no longer a slave because he had become free when he lived in a free state.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
2. Plessy v Ferguson (1896)
In 1890, Louisiana passed a law called the "Separate Car Act." This law said that railroad companies must provide separate but equal train cars for whites and blacks and the races must be segregated. Anyone who broke this law would have to pay $25 or go to jail for 20 days.
Homer Plessy was a 30-year-old shoemaker who lived in Louisiana. On June 7, 1892, Plessy purchased a train ticket from New Orleans to Covington, Louisiana. Plessy was one-eighth black, but under Louisiana law he was considered black. Therefore, he was required to sit in the "Colored" car. However, Plessy sat in the "White" car and was arrested.
Plessy argued that the Separate Car Act violated the 13th (slavery is illegal) and 14th (government must treat citizens equally) Amendments to the constitution.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
3. Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
In the early 1950s, many students went to different schools because of their race, under a segregated system. Many other public facilities were also segregated. Under segregation, all-white and all-black schools sometimes had similar buildings, busses, and teachers. Sometimes, the buildings, busses, and teachers for the all-black schools were lower in quality. Often, black children had to travel far to get to their school. In Topeka, Kansas, a black student named Linda Brown had to walk through a dangerous railroad to get to her all-black school. Her family believed that segregated schools should be illegal. The Brown family sued the school system (Board of Education of Topeka). The district court said that segregation hurt black children. However, the district court also said the schools were equal.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
4. Roe v. Wade (1973)
Jane Roe (not her real name) was unmarried and pregnant and lived in Texas. She wanted to have an abortion, but according to Texas law she could not have an abortion unless her life was in danger. Roe challenged the law by suing Wade, the district attorney where she lived.
Roe argued that she had a right to privacy and should be able to decide whether to have an abortion or not. She argued that the right to privacy comes from combining several other rights listed in the Bill of Rights. The state argued that “the right to life of the unborn child is superior to the right to privacy of the mother.” The state also argued that this is a topic that should be left to the legislatures to decide how to handle.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
5. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)
In the early 1970s, the medical school of the University of California at Davis admitted 100 students each year. The university used two admissions programs: a regular admissions program and a special admissions program. The purpose of the special admissions program was to increase the number of minority and “disadvantaged” students in the class. Applicants who were members of a minority group or who believed that they were disadvantaged could apply for the special admissions program.
In the regular admissions program, applicants had to have a grade point average of at least a 2.5. on a 4.0 scale or they were automatically rejected. In the special admissions program, however, applicants did not have to have a 2.5 GPA. 16 of the 100 spaces in the medical program were reserved only for the disadvantaged students. This is known as a quota system. From 1971 to 1974, the special program admitted 21 black students, 30 Mexican Americans, and 12 Asians, for a total of 63 minority students. The regular program admitted 1 black student, 6 Mexican Americans, and 37 Asians, for a total of 44 minority students. No disadvantaged white candidates were admitted through the special program.
Allan Bakke was a white male. He applied to and was rejected from the regular admissions program in 1973 and 1974. Minority applicants with lower scores than Bakke's were admitted under the special program. After his second rejection, Bakke filed a lawsuit. He wanted the Court to force the University of California at Davis to admit him to the medical school. He also claimed that the special admissions program violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Bakke said that the University, a state school, was treating him unequally because of his race.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED?
1. Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857)
The court ruled that African Americans were not and could never be citizens. Thus, Dred Scott had no right to even file a lawsuit and remained enslaved.
2. Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)
The court ruled that separate-but-equal facilities for blacks and whites did not violate the Constitution, establishing a policy of legal segregation.
3. Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
The court ruled that segregated public schools were inherently unequal and therefore unconstitutional (overturning policy of separate-but-equal)
4. Roe v. Wade (1973)
The court ruled that women do have the right to choose in the first three months of pregnancy.
5. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)
The court ruled that racial quotas were unconstitutional, but that schools could still consider race as a factor in admissions.
Lesson Plan
A. Have students (in groups of 3 or 5) read each of the 5 court cases listed in the two-sided handout. Have them decide as a group what should be done in each court case (and why), but be sure to note if there are any students who disagree with the consensus (and why).
B. Put up overhead with actual results of each of the court cases, and have students take notes.
C. For homework, or as a wrap up assignment, have students answer the following question (answer should be at least a ½ page):
Our Constitution has been described as a living Constitution (because it can change with the times). If it is alive, has wisdom come with age? Justify your answer using the court cases we discussed as a class.
WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN? Personal Rights – Protest, Speech, Privacy
1. Tinker v. Des Moines (1969)
John and Mary Beth Tinker of Des Moines, Iowa, wore black armbands to their public school as a symbol of protest against American involvement in the Vietnam War. When school authorities asked that the Tinkers remove their armbands, they refused and were subsequently suspended.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
2. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988)
Hazelwood East High School Principal Robert Reynolds procedurally reviewed the Spectrum, the school’s student-written newspaper, before publication. In May 1983, he decided to have certain pages pulled because of the sensitive content in two of the articles, and acted quickly to remove them in order to meet the paper’s publication deadline. The articles dealt with issues of teen pregnancy and divorce, topics that Principal Reynolds felt were inappropriate for younger readers. The journalism students felt that this censorship was a direct violation of their First Amendment rights.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
3. Texas v. Johnson (1989)
In a political demonstration during the Republican National Convention in Texas, protesting the policies of the Reagan Administration and of certain corporations based in Dallas, Gregory Lee Johnson doused an American flag with kerosene and set it on fire. No one was hurt or threatened with injury, but some witnesses said they were seriously offended, and Johnson was charged and convicted with the desecration of a venerated object, in violation of the Texas Penal Code.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
3. New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985)
A New Jersey high school student was accused of violating school rules by smoking in the bathroom, leading an assistant principal to search her purse for cigarettes. The vice principal discovered marijuana and other items that implicated the student in dealing marijuana. The student tried to have the evidence from her purse suppressed, contending that mere possession of cigarettes was not a violation of school rules; therefore, a desire for evidence of smoking in the restroom did not justify the search.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED?
1. Tinker v. Des Moines (1969)
The Supreme Court decided that the Tinkers had the right to wear the armbands, with Justice Abe Fortas stating that no one expects students to “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”
The Court ruled that students are entitled to exercise their constitutional rights, even while in school. The justices reasoned that neither “students (n)or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Because student expression is protected by the First Amendment even while in school, school officials must provide constitutionally valid reasons for regulating student expression.
The justification for the regulation must be more than “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.” School officials must show that the expression would cause a “material and substantial disruption” with the discipline and educational function of the school. The Court decided that allowing the Tinkers to wear their armbands protesting the Vietnam conflict would not “substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students.” Wearing the armbands was a “silent, passive expression of opinion” that did not involve any “disorder or disturbance,” and was unlikely to cause a “material and substantial disruption” in the school.
In addition, the justices noted that the school officials specifically targeted anti-war armbands, but did not prohibit the wearing of any other symbols conveying a political message. Reasoning that “the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion … is not constitutionally permissible,” they concluded that “school officials do not poses absolute authority over their students.”
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Black acknowledged that while the content of speech generally cannot be regulated or censored, “it is a myth to say that any person has a constitutional right to say what he pleases, where he pleases, and when he pleases.” According to Justice Black, the Tinkers’ armbands did indeed cause a disturbance by taking students’ minds off their class work “and divert[ing] them to thoughts about the highly emotional subject of the Vietnam War.” This was exactly what school officials were trying to prevent. Justice Black believed that the majority’s ruling was too restrictive on school officials, overly limiting their control over their schools, and subjecting public schools to “the whims and caprices of their loudest-mouthed … students.”
2. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988)
The Supreme Court decided that Principal Reynolds had the right to such editorial decisions, as he had “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”
The majority opinion first considered whether school-sponsored student newspapers are public forums. If they were public forums, school officials would not be allowed to exercise editorial control over the content of the paper. Referring to Supreme Court precedent, the decision noted that school facilities are only considered to be public forums when school authorities have “’by policy or by practice’ opened those facilities ‘for indiscriminate use by the general public.’” If the facilities are used for other purposes, however, they do not constitute a public forum, and “school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students.” The school newspaper in this case was not open to the unlimited contribution of students, teachers and other members of the community, but was instead published as part of the curriculum of a journalism class. Therefore, its primary function was for educational purposes, and the newspaper did not constitute a public forum.
The Court then addressed the question of whether the First Amendment “requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech.” They concluded that it does not. The First Amendment rights of students in public schools are not necessarily equal to those of adults outside of schools. “A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school.”
The Court decided that the issues involved in this case differ from those the Court ruled on in Tinker v. Des Moines. In that case, the Court questioned whether school officials could “silence a student’s personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises.” Hazelwood, however, forced the Court to consider the extent of school officials’ control over “school-sponsored publications … and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the [approval] of the school.” Tinker asked whether schools must tolerate certain student speech, while this case questioned whether schools must endorse student speech.
The Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment does not force schools to endorse student speech in their school-sponsored publications. School officials have authority and control over these publications in order to ensure that “participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.” Therefore, as long as the editorial control of school officials was “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns” such as those mentioned above, it did not offend the First Amendment.
Justice Brennan disagreed. In his dissenting opinion, Brennan acknowledged that inside public schools, students’ rights are not necessarily equal to those they enjoy outside of school, but he also argued that as the Court said in Tinker, “students in the public schools do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’” There must be a balance struck between the free expression rights of students and the interests of schools officials in maintaining order and discipline, he declared, and that balance was already struck in Tinker. School officials must refrain from interfering with student speech unless it causes a “material and substantial disruption.” Justice Brennan concluded that the Tinker standard should have been applied in this case, and that the Court should have ruled in favor of the students because “public educators must accommodate some student expression even if it offends them or offers views or values that contradict those the schools wishes to inculcate.”
3. Texas v. Johnson (1989)
In a split decision, the Supreme Court determined that Johnson’s actions were symbolic speech protected by his First Amendment Rights.
The justices in the majority first considered whether expressive conduct was protected by the First Amendment, which only explicitly guarantees “freedom of speech.” Noting that the Court has “long recognized that [First Amendment] protection does not end at the spoken or written word,” they added that conduct may be “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Conduct is sufficiently expressive when “an intent to convey a particularized message was present, and the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.” Given the context of political protest in which Johnson’s conduct occurred, the justices concluded that it was sufficiently expressive to invoke First Amendment protection.
The Court acknowledged that while “the government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word,” it still cannot prohibit certain conduct just because it disapproves of the ideas expressed. The justices declared that “if there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” The government must have reasons for regulating the conduct that are unrelated to the popularity of the ideas it expresses.
The Court considered two central arguments asserted by Texas. The first was that the government can prevent expressive speech to prevent breaches of the peace. According to Supreme Court precedent, speech can be prohibited when it would incite “imminent lawless action.” The justices decided that the Texas law prohibiting flag burning did not limit its prohibition to situations in which it would incite “imminent lawless action,” and no such violent disturbance of the peace occurred when Johnson burned the flag. This reason was therefore not sufficient.
Second, Texas argued that the reason for prohibiting flag burning was to preserve the flag as a symbol of national unity. The Court decided, however, that the Court had never “recognized an exception to [the First Amendment] even where our flag has been involved.” They acknowledged that while the government does have an interest in encouraging its citizens to treat the flag with respect, this interest did not justify the criminal prosecution of a man who burned the flag as part of a political protest.
A better way to encourage respect for the American flag would be to persuade people to recognize its unique symbolic value. The justices urged that there is “no more appropriate response to burning a flag than waving one’s own, no better way to counter a flag burner’s message than by saluting the flag that burns, no surer means of preserving the dignity even of the flag that burned than by ... according its remains a respectful burial.” The Court concluded that “we do not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents.”
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the special place the flag holds as the “visible symbol embodying our nation,” noting that “millions and millions of Americans regard it with an almost mystical reverence.” Because of its unique position, Rehnquist concluded that it was constitutionally permissible to prohibit burning the flag as a means of symbolic expression. He argued that Texas’s prohibition on flag burning did not regulate the content of Johnson’s message, but only removed one of the ways in which this message could be expressed. Johnson was left with “a full panoply of other symbols and every conceivable form of verbal expression” to convey his message. A ban on flag burning is thus consistent with the First Amendment, Justice Rehnquist concluded, because it is not directed at suppressing particular ideas, but rather seeks only to protect the special significance of the flag as the symbol of the United States.
4. New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985)
The Supreme Court decided that the search did not violate the Constitution and established more lenient standards for reasonableness in school searches.
The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to public school officials because they act under the authority of the state. In addition students have a reasonable expectation of privacy for the property they bring with them to school. They have not “waived all rights to privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto school grounds.”
However, the justices said the privacy interest of students must be balanced against the interest of teachers and school officials in maintaining order and discipline in school. Trying to achieve a balance between these interests, the Supreme Court ruled that school officials should not be required to obtain a warrant to conduct a search of a student suspected of breaking school rules because this would “unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.”
The Court decided that schools officials do not need to have probable cause to believe that a student has violated school rules in order to initiate a search, even though probable cause is required for police to initiate a search of children or adults outside of school. Instead, school officials are only required to have a “reasonable suspicion” that a student has violated school rules in order to search that student. A search will be deemed reasonable if, when it is started, “there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated … either the law or the rules of the school.” In addition, the scope of the search must be “reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” The Court concluded that “the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.”
Applying this standard to T.L.O., the Court ruled that the search was reasonable. It was reasonable for the vice principal to believe that T.L.O. had been smoking in the bathroom in violation of school rules because a teacher witnessed it. Thus the vice principal had adequate grounds to search T.L.O.’s purse for cigarettes. While doing so, he came across evidence suggesting that T.L.O. was selling marijuana in the school. This gave him grounds to search the rest of her purse for drugs.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan first argued that the same probable cause standard that is applied outside of schools should be applied inside schools. The Fourth Amendment states that “the right of the people to be secure … against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.” According to Justice Brennan’s interpretation, the Fourth Amendment explains what it means by “unreasonable” by specifying that “no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause.” Thus, searches that take place without probable cause, including those based only on “reasonable suspicion,” are unreasonable, and violate the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Stevens also dissented. Like Justice Brennan, he believed that the Court’s new standard of “reasonable suspicion” was inappropriate. Instead of allowing school officials to search a student based on the reasonable suspicion that the student was breaking a school rule, Justice Stevens would require that the student be suspected of “violating the law or engaging in conduct that is seriously disruptive of school order, or the educational process.” Smoking in the bathroom was not a “violent or disruptive activity,” he argued, so an immediate search was unnecessary.
WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN? Personal Rights – Equal Protection, Due Process
1. Korematsu v. United States (1944)
After Pearl Harbor was bombed in December 1941, the military feared a Japanese attack on the U.S. mainland and the American government was worried that Americans of Japanese descent might aid the enemy. In 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed an executive order forcing many West Coast Japanese and Japanese Americans into internment camps. Fred Korematsu, a Japanese American, relocated and claimed to be Mexican-American to avoid being interned, but was later arrested and convicted of violating an executive order. Korematsu challenged his conviction in the courts saying that Congress, the President, and the military authorities did not have the power to issue the relocation orders and that he was being discriminated against based on his race. The government argued that the evacuation was necessary to protect the country and the federal appeals court agreed. Korematsu appealed this decision and the case came before the U.S. Supreme Court.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
2. Mapp v. Ohio (1961)
Suspicious that Dollree Mapp might be hiding a person suspected in a bombing, the police went to her home in Cleveland, Ohio. They knocked on her door and demanded entrance, but Mapp refused to let them in because they did not have a warrant. After observing her house for several hours, the police forced their way into Mapp's house, holding up a piece of paper when Mapp demanded to see their search warrant. As a result of their search, the police found a trunk containing pornographic materials. They arrested Mapp and charged her with violating an Ohio law against the possession of obscene materials. At the trial the police officers did not show Mapp and her attorney the alleged search warrant or explain why they refused to do so. Nevertheless, the court found Mapp guilty and sentenced her to jail. After losing an appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, Mapp took her case to the U.S. Supreme Court.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
3. Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)
In June 1961, a burglary occurred at the Bay Harbor Pool Room in Panama City, FL. Police arrested Clarence Earl Gideon after he was found nearby with a pint of wine and some change in his pockets. Gideon, who could not afford a lawyer, asked a Florida Circuit Court judge to appoint one for him arguing that the Sixth Amendment entitles everyone to a lawyer. The judge denied his request and Gideon was left to represent himself. He did a poor job of defending himself and was found guilty of breaking and entering and petty larceny. While serving his sentence in a Florida state prison, Gideon began studying law, which reaffirmed his belief his rights were violated when the Florida Circuit Court refused his request for counsel. From his prison cell, he handwrote a petition asking the U.S. Supreme Court to hear his case and it agreed.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
4. Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
Ernesto Miranda was arrested after a crime victim identified him, but police officers questioning him did not inform him of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, or of his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of an attorney. While he confessed to the crime, his attorney later argued that his confession should have been excluded from trial.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
What actually happened?
1. Korematsu v. United States (1944)
The Court agreed with government and stated that the need to protect the country was a greater priority than the individual rights of the Japanese and Japanese Americans.
2. Mapp v. Ohio (1961)
The Court determined that evidence obtained through a search that violates the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in state courts.
In a 5-3 decision,* the Court ruled in favor of Mapp. The majority opinion, written by Justice Clark, applied the exclusionary rule to the states. That rule requires courts to exclude from criminal trials evidence that was obtained in violation of the constitution’s ban on unreasonable searches and arrests. Justice Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion. The majority opinion was based on several earlier decisions that had begun the process of applying federal constitutional protections to state criminal justice systems.
In one of those earlier decisions, the Supreme Court had ruled that the states must be bound by the Fourth Amendment because its guarantees were part of the “due process of law” required of states by the Fourteenth Amendment. That decision essentially required the Fourth Amendment’s provisions, which previously had only applied to the federal government, to apply to the states as well. The justices ruled that since the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment applied to both the federal and state governments, they should be enforced the same way in both federal and state courts. Evidence obtained unlawfully is not admissible in federal court, so it should not be admissible in state courts either.
In his dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the majority had confronted the wrong issue in its decision. Because Ms. Mapp was convicted under an Ohio statute criminalizing the possession of obscene material, Justice Harlan believed that the “new and pivotal issue” was whether this statute “is consistent with the rights of free thought and expression assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Thus, he concluded that the majority had ignored the principles of judicial restraint and stare decisis, and had “’reached out’” to consider the exclusionary rule issue. According to Justice Harlan, this was a First Amendment case and not an appropriate case for extending the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule to the states. He also concluded that it was wrong to impose the exclusionary rule, designed for the federal criminal process, on the states which, in his view, bore quite different responsibilities in this area of law.
3. Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)
The Court unanimously ruled in Gideon’s favor, stating that the Six Amendment requires state courts to provide attorneys for criminal defendants who cannot otherwise afford counsel.
The Court said that the best proof that the right to counsel was fundamental and essential was that “[g]overnments … spend vast sums of money to … try defendants accused of crime … Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime[s]… who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses.” This indicated that both the government and defendants considered the aid of a lawyer in criminal cases absolutely necessary. In addition, the opinion noted that the Constitution places great emphasis on procedural safeguards designed to guarantee that defendants get fair trials. According to the opinion, “this noble idea cannot be realized if the poor man charged with a crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.” The Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a right to counsel was fundamental and essential to a fair trial in both state and federal criminal justice systems. In all felony criminal cases, states must provide lawyers for indigent defendants.
4. Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
The Supreme Court agreed, deciding that the police had not taken proper steps to inform Miranda of his rights.
In their majority opinion, the justices explained that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is fundamental to our system of justice, and is “one of our Nation’s most cherished principles.” This guarantee requires that only statements freely made by a defendant may be used in court. The justices described some of the techniques used by police officers in interrogations. They observed that “the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented,” and cited the advantage police officers hold in custodial interrogations (interrogations that take place while the subject is in police custody). Because of these advantages, they concluded that “the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty, and trades on the weakness of individuals.”
The Court ruled that in order to reconcile the necessary practice of custodial interrogations with the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, police must ensure that defendants are aware of their rights before they are interrogated in custody. Because the right against self-incrimination is so important to our system of justice, a case by case determination made by police officers of whether each defendant understands his or her rights is not sufficient. Before interrogating defendants in police custody, they must be warned 1) that they have the right to remain silent 2) that anything they say may be used against them in court, 3) that they have the right to an attorney, either retained by them or appointed by the court, and 4) that they may waive these rights, but they retain the right to ask for an attorney any time during the interrogation, at which point the interrogation can only continue in the presence of a lawyer.
The Supreme Court reasoned that because the right against self-incrimination is so fundamental, and because it is so simple to inform defendants of their rights, any statements made by defendants during a custodial interrogation in which the defendant has not been read his “Miranda rights” are inadmissible in both state and federal courts.
Justice Harlan wrote the main dissent. He argued that the newly created rules did not protect against police brutality, coercion or other abuses of authority during custodial interrogations because officers willing to use such illegal tactics and deny their use in court were “equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about warnings and waivers.” Instead, he predicted that the new requirements would impair and substantially frustrate police officers in the use of techniques that had long been considered appropriate and even necessary, thus reducing the number of confessions police would be able to obtain. He concluded that the harmful effects of crime on society were “too great to call the new rules anything but a hazardous experimentation.”
A student is moved into a special program at a different school based on his ethnicity.
A student is denied entrance to the school of her choice based on her ethnicity.
A college asks students to identify their ethnicity on their application forms.
A school principal confiscates a student’s phone. Later, suspecting that the student may have been involved in illegal activities at school, the principal reads the students’ texts.
A media teacher pulls an advertisement from the morning announcements, worried that the message of the advertisement may be too sensitive or inappropriate for freshmen.
Several students wear
Middle-Eastern men are captured by American soldiers, transferred to an American prison, and held as possible terrorist suspects.
The police obtain a search warrant for a suspected illegal cell phone seller’s home for stolen property. The police do not find any cell phones, but while searching the home the police discover evidence of an illegal drug operation.
A police officer begins asking questions of a suspect immediately after arrest.
More of the Court's most important rulings on freedom of speech and privacy at school, and other issues affecting teenagers.
By Tom Jacobs
Part 1 of this article (Upfront, Sept. 3, 2007) addressed five Supreme Court cases dealing with issues both in and out of the classroom, including students' right to protest, school prayer, and how the legal system treats teenagers. Part 2 looks at five more key cases, involving student newspapers, drug testing of athletes, after-school clubs, the use of race in college admissions, and whether children have constitutional protections at home.
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (1988)
Issue: Student Journalism and the First Amendment
Bottom Line: Schools Can Censor Student Newspapers
Background
Cathy Kuhlmeier, Leslie Smart, and Leanne Tippett, juniors at Hazelwood East High School in St. Louis, Missouri, helped write and edit the school paper, the Spectrum, as part of a journalism class. An issue of the paper was to include articles about the impact of divorce on students and teen pregnancy. The school's principal refused to publish the two stories, saying they were too sensitive for younger students and contained too many personal details. The girls went to court claiming their First Amendment right to freedom of expression had been violated.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled against the girls. A school newspaper isn't a public forum in which anyone can voice an opinion, the Court said, but rather a supervised learning experience for students interested in journalism. "Educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities," the Court said, "so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate [educational] concerns."
Impact
Schools may censor newspapers and restrict other forms of student expression, including theatrical productions, yearbooks, creative writing assignments, and campaign and graduation speeches. But the Court's ruling in Hazelwood encourages schools to look closely at a student activity before imposing any restrictions and to balance the goal of maintaining high standards for student speech with students' right to free expression.
Vernonia School District v. Acton (1995)
Issue: Student Athletes and Drug Testing
Bottom Line: Schools Can Require It
Background
James Acton, a 12-year-old seventh-grader at Washington Grade School in Vernonia, Oregon, wanted to try out for the football team. His school required all student athletes to take drug tests at the beginning of the season and on a random basis during the school year. James's parents refused to let him be tested because, they said, there was no evidence that he used drugs or alcohol. The school suspended James from sports for the season. He and his parents sued the school district, arguing that mandatory drug testing without suspicion of illegal activity constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the school district. Schools must balance students' right to privacy against the need to make school campuses safe and keep student athletes away from drugs, the Court said. The drug-testing policy, which required students to provide a urine sample, involved only a limited invasion of privacy, according to the Justices: "Students who voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy."
The Court noted that all students surrender some privacy rights while at school: They must follow school rules and submit to school discipline. But student athletes have even fewer privacy rights, the Justices said, and must follow rules that don't apply to other students. Joining a team usually requires getting a physical exam, obtaining insurance coverage, and maintaining a minimum grade point average. And athletes must be willing to shower and change in locker rooms, further reducing their privacy. "School sports are not for the bashful," the Court said.
Impact
More recently, the Court has ruled in favor of school policies requiring random drug testing for all extracurricular activities (Board of Education v. Earls, 2002).
West Side Community Schools v. Mergens (1990) Issue: Student Clubs
Bottom Line: Public Schools That Allow Student-interest Clubs Cannot Exclude Religious or political ones
Background
Bridget Mergens was a senior at Westside High School in Omaha, Nebraska. She asked her homeroom teacher, who was also the school's principal, for permission to start an after-school Christian club. Westside High already had about 30 clubs, including a chess club and a scuba-diving club. The principal denied Bridget's request, telling her that a religious club would be illegal in a public school.
The year before, in 1984, Congress had addressed this issue in the Equal Access Act, which required public schools to allow religious and political clubs if they let students form other kinds of student-interest clubs. When Bridget challenged the principal's decision, her lawsuit became the Supreme Court's test case for deciding whether the Equal Access Act was constitutional under what is known as the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Bridget. Allowing students to meet on campus to discuss religion after school did not amount to state sponsorship of religion, the Court said: "We think that secondary-school students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits."
Impact
If a public school allows only clubs tied to the school curriculum—a French club related to French classes, for instance—it can exclude clubs that don't connect to its educational mission. But once a school allows student-interest clubs—such as a scuba-diving club, environmental club, or jazz club—it cannot exclude religious clubs, political clubs, gay-lesbian clubs, or other groups.
If the club is religious in nature, however, the school must refrain from active involvement or sponsorship, so that it doesn't run afoul of the Establishment Clause, the Court said.
Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)
Issue: Affirmative Action in College
Bottom Line: Colleges Can Use Race as a Factor in Admissions
Background
In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white Michigan resident, was denied admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter, who had a 3.8 undergraduate grade point average and good standardized test scores, sued the university over the law school's affirmative action policy, which considered race as a factor in admissions. Michigan and many other universities use affirmative action to increase the number of minority students admitted. Grutter claimed that Michigan admitted less-qualified minority applicants in violation of federal civil rights laws and the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees citizens "equal protection" under the law.
Ruling
The Supreme Court upheld the use of affirmative action in higher education. "Student-body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions," the Court said. But the Court emphasized that the University of Michigan's policy was acceptable because the school conducted a thorough review of each applicant's qualifications and did not use a racial quota system—meaning it did not set aside a specific number of offers for minority applicants.
Impact
Affirmative action, which has its origins in a 1961 executive order issued by President John F. Kennedy, continues to be a contentious issue, with critics charging that it amounts to reverse discrimination. Since 1996, voters in three states—California, Washington, and, most recently, Michigan—have approved laws banning affirmative action in public education, in state government hiring, and the awarding of state contracts. (At Upfrontmagazine.com: a look at the Court's decision in June limiting the use of race in public school integration plans.)
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social Services (1989)
Issue: Constitutional Rights at Home
Bottom Line: The Constitution Doesn't Protect Kids from Their Parents
Background
Four-year-old Joshua DeShaney lived with his father, who physically abused him, in Neenah, Wisconsin. At one point, the State Department of Social Services took custody of Joshua but returned him after three days. Later, Joshua was hospitalized with bruises all over his body and severe brain damage. He survived, but was permanently paralyzed and mentally disabled. His father was convicted of child abuse and sent to prison. Joshua's mother sued the Department of Social Services for returning him to his father. She argued that the department had a duty to protect her son under the Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids the state from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
Ruling
The Court ruled against Joshua and his mother. It said essentially that the Constitution does not protect children from their parents and that therefore the government was not at fault in Joshua's abuse.
Impact
The Supreme Court has consistently respected parents' rights to discipline their children. But even though the government isn't required under the Constitution to protect children, all states assume this responsibility through child protection laws. The Supreme Court has generally deferred to state and local governments to enforce these laws and to intervene in cases of mistreatment.
WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN? Equal Rights & Treatment
1. Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857)
Dred Scott was born a slave in Virginia around 1799. In 1834, a man named Dr. Emerson bought Dred Scott and they moved to Illinois, a non-slave (free) state. In 1836, they moved to Minnesota, also a non-slave state. In 1838, the Emersons and Scott moved to Missouri, a slave state.
In 1843, Dr. Emerson died, leaving his wife possession of Scott. Dred Scott sued Mrs. Emerson. He claimed that he was no longer a slave because he had become free when he lived in a free state.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
2. Plessy v Ferguson (1896)
In 1890, Louisiana passed a law called the "Separate Car Act." This law said that railroad companies must provide separate but equal train cars for whites and blacks and the races must be segregated. Anyone who broke this law would have to pay $25 or go to jail for 20 days.
Homer Plessy was a 30-year-old shoemaker who lived in Louisiana. On June 7, 1892, Plessy purchased a train ticket from New Orleans to Covington, Louisiana. Plessy was one-eighth black, but under Louisiana law he was considered black. Therefore, he was required to sit in the "Colored" car. However, Plessy sat in the "White" car and was arrested.
Plessy argued that the Separate Car Act violated the 13th (slavery is illegal) and 14th (government must treat citizens equally) Amendments to the constitution.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
3. Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
In the early 1950s, many students went to different schools because of their race, under a segregated system. Many other public facilities were also segregated. Under segregation, all-white and all-black schools sometimes had similar buildings, busses, and teachers. Sometimes, the buildings, busses, and teachers for the all-black schools were lower in quality. Often, black children had to travel far to get to their school. In Topeka, Kansas, a black student named Linda Brown had to walk through a dangerous railroad to get to her all-black school. Her family believed that segregated schools should be illegal. The Brown family sued the school system (Board of Education of Topeka). The district court said that segregation hurt black children. However, the district court also said the schools were equal.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
4. Roe v. Wade (1973)
Jane Roe (not her real name) was unmarried and pregnant and lived in Texas. She wanted to have an abortion, but according to Texas law she could not have an abortion unless her life was in danger. Roe challenged the law by suing Wade, the district attorney where she lived.
Roe argued that she had a right to privacy and should be able to decide whether to have an abortion or not. She argued that the right to privacy comes from combining several other rights listed in the Bill of Rights. The state argued that “the right to life of the unborn child is superior to the right to privacy of the mother.” The state also argued that this is a topic that should be left to the legislatures to decide how to handle.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
5. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)
In the early 1970s, the medical school of the University of California at Davis admitted 100 students each year. The university used two admissions programs: a regular admissions program and a special admissions program. The purpose of the special admissions program was to increase the number of minority and “disadvantaged” students in the class. Applicants who were members of a minority group or who believed that they were disadvantaged could apply for the special admissions program.
In the regular admissions program, applicants had to have a grade point average of at least a 2.5. on a 4.0 scale or they were automatically rejected. In the special admissions program, however, applicants did not have to have a 2.5 GPA. 16 of the 100 spaces in the medical program were reserved only for the disadvantaged students. This is known as a quota system. From 1971 to 1974, the special program admitted 21 black students, 30 Mexican Americans, and 12 Asians, for a total of 63 minority students. The regular program admitted 1 black student, 6 Mexican Americans, and 37 Asians, for a total of 44 minority students. No disadvantaged white candidates were admitted through the special program.
Allan Bakke was a white male. He applied to and was rejected from the regular admissions program in 1973 and 1974. Minority applicants with lower scores than Bakke's were admitted under the special program. After his second rejection, Bakke filed a lawsuit. He wanted the Court to force the University of California at Davis to admit him to the medical school. He also claimed that the special admissions program violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Bakke said that the University, a state school, was treating him unequally because of his race.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED?
1. Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857)
The court ruled that African Americans were not and could never be citizens. Thus, Dred Scott had no right to even file a lawsuit and remained enslaved.
2. Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)
The court ruled that separate-but-equal facilities for blacks and whites did not violate the Constitution, establishing a policy of legal segregation.
3. Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
The court ruled that segregated public schools were inherently unequal and therefore unconstitutional (overturning policy of separate-but-equal)
4. Roe v. Wade (1973)
The court ruled that women do have the right to choose in the first three months of pregnancy.
5. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)
The court ruled that racial quotas were unconstitutional, but that schools could still consider race as a factor in admissions.
Lesson Plan
A. Have students (in groups of 3 or 5) read each of the 5 court cases listed in the two-sided handout. Have them decide as a group what should be done in each court case (and why), but be sure to note if there are any students who disagree with the consensus (and why).
B. Put up overhead with actual results of each of the court cases, and have students take notes.
C. For homework, or as a wrap up assignment, have students answer the following question (answer should be at least a ½ page):
Our Constitution has been described as a living Constitution (because it can change with the times). If it is alive, has wisdom come with age? Justify your answer using the court cases we discussed as a class.
WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN? Personal Rights – Protest, Speech, Privacy
1. Tinker v. Des Moines (1969)
John and Mary Beth Tinker of Des Moines, Iowa, wore black armbands to their public school as a symbol of protest against American involvement in the Vietnam War. When school authorities asked that the Tinkers remove their armbands, they refused and were subsequently suspended.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
2. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988)
Hazelwood East High School Principal Robert Reynolds procedurally reviewed the Spectrum, the school’s student-written newspaper, before publication. In May 1983, he decided to have certain pages pulled because of the sensitive content in two of the articles, and acted quickly to remove them in order to meet the paper’s publication deadline. The articles dealt with issues of teen pregnancy and divorce, topics that Principal Reynolds felt were inappropriate for younger readers. The journalism students felt that this censorship was a direct violation of their First Amendment rights.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
3. Texas v. Johnson (1989)
In a political demonstration during the Republican National Convention in Texas, protesting the policies of the Reagan Administration and of certain corporations based in Dallas, Gregory Lee Johnson doused an American flag with kerosene and set it on fire. No one was hurt or threatened with injury, but some witnesses said they were seriously offended, and Johnson was charged and convicted with the desecration of a venerated object, in violation of the Texas Penal Code.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
3. New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985)
A New Jersey high school student was accused of violating school rules by smoking in the bathroom, leading an assistant principal to search her purse for cigarettes. The vice principal discovered marijuana and other items that implicated the student in dealing marijuana. The student tried to have the evidence from her purse suppressed, contending that mere possession of cigarettes was not a violation of school rules; therefore, a desire for evidence of smoking in the restroom did not justify the search.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED?
1. Tinker v. Des Moines (1969)
The Supreme Court decided that the Tinkers had the right to wear the armbands, with Justice Abe Fortas stating that no one expects students to “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”
The Court ruled that students are entitled to exercise their constitutional rights, even while in school. The justices reasoned that neither “students (n)or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” Because student expression is protected by the First Amendment even while in school, school officials must provide constitutionally valid reasons for regulating student expression.
The justification for the regulation must be more than “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.” School officials must show that the expression would cause a “material and substantial disruption” with the discipline and educational function of the school. The Court decided that allowing the Tinkers to wear their armbands protesting the Vietnam conflict would not “substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students.” Wearing the armbands was a “silent, passive expression of opinion” that did not involve any “disorder or disturbance,” and was unlikely to cause a “material and substantial disruption” in the school.
In addition, the justices noted that the school officials specifically targeted anti-war armbands, but did not prohibit the wearing of any other symbols conveying a political message. Reasoning that “the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion … is not constitutionally permissible,” they concluded that “school officials do not poses absolute authority over their students.”
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Black acknowledged that while the content of speech generally cannot be regulated or censored, “it is a myth to say that any person has a constitutional right to say what he pleases, where he pleases, and when he pleases.” According to Justice Black, the Tinkers’ armbands did indeed cause a disturbance by taking students’ minds off their class work “and divert[ing] them to thoughts about the highly emotional subject of the Vietnam War.” This was exactly what school officials were trying to prevent. Justice Black believed that the majority’s ruling was too restrictive on school officials, overly limiting their control over their schools, and subjecting public schools to “the whims and caprices of their loudest-mouthed … students.”
2. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988)
The Supreme Court decided that Principal Reynolds had the right to such editorial decisions, as he had “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”
The majority opinion first considered whether school-sponsored student newspapers are public forums. If they were public forums, school officials would not be allowed to exercise editorial control over the content of the paper. Referring to Supreme Court precedent, the decision noted that school facilities are only considered to be public forums when school authorities have “’by policy or by practice’ opened those facilities ‘for indiscriminate use by the general public.’” If the facilities are used for other purposes, however, they do not constitute a public forum, and “school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students.” The school newspaper in this case was not open to the unlimited contribution of students, teachers and other members of the community, but was instead published as part of the curriculum of a journalism class. Therefore, its primary function was for educational purposes, and the newspaper did not constitute a public forum.
The Court then addressed the question of whether the First Amendment “requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech.” They concluded that it does not. The First Amendment rights of students in public schools are not necessarily equal to those of adults outside of schools. “A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school.”
The Court decided that the issues involved in this case differ from those the Court ruled on in Tinker v. Des Moines. In that case, the Court questioned whether school officials could “silence a student’s personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises.” Hazelwood, however, forced the Court to consider the extent of school officials’ control over “school-sponsored publications … and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the [approval] of the school.” Tinker asked whether schools must tolerate certain student speech, while this case questioned whether schools must endorse student speech.
The Supreme Court concluded that the First Amendment does not force schools to endorse student speech in their school-sponsored publications. School officials have authority and control over these publications in order to ensure that “participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.” Therefore, as long as the editorial control of school officials was “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns” such as those mentioned above, it did not offend the First Amendment.
Justice Brennan disagreed. In his dissenting opinion, Brennan acknowledged that inside public schools, students’ rights are not necessarily equal to those they enjoy outside of school, but he also argued that as the Court said in Tinker, “students in the public schools do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’” There must be a balance struck between the free expression rights of students and the interests of schools officials in maintaining order and discipline, he declared, and that balance was already struck in Tinker. School officials must refrain from interfering with student speech unless it causes a “material and substantial disruption.” Justice Brennan concluded that the Tinker standard should have been applied in this case, and that the Court should have ruled in favor of the students because “public educators must accommodate some student expression even if it offends them or offers views or values that contradict those the schools wishes to inculcate.”
3. Texas v. Johnson (1989)
In a split decision, the Supreme Court determined that Johnson’s actions were symbolic speech protected by his First Amendment Rights.
The justices in the majority first considered whether expressive conduct was protected by the First Amendment, which only explicitly guarantees “freedom of speech.” Noting that the Court has “long recognized that [First Amendment] protection does not end at the spoken or written word,” they added that conduct may be “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Conduct is sufficiently expressive when “an intent to convey a particularized message was present, and the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.” Given the context of political protest in which Johnson’s conduct occurred, the justices concluded that it was sufficiently expressive to invoke First Amendment protection.
The Court acknowledged that while “the government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word,” it still cannot prohibit certain conduct just because it disapproves of the ideas expressed. The justices declared that “if there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” The government must have reasons for regulating the conduct that are unrelated to the popularity of the ideas it expresses.
The Court considered two central arguments asserted by Texas. The first was that the government can prevent expressive speech to prevent breaches of the peace. According to Supreme Court precedent, speech can be prohibited when it would incite “imminent lawless action.” The justices decided that the Texas law prohibiting flag burning did not limit its prohibition to situations in which it would incite “imminent lawless action,” and no such violent disturbance of the peace occurred when Johnson burned the flag. This reason was therefore not sufficient.
Second, Texas argued that the reason for prohibiting flag burning was to preserve the flag as a symbol of national unity. The Court decided, however, that the Court had never “recognized an exception to [the First Amendment] even where our flag has been involved.” They acknowledged that while the government does have an interest in encouraging its citizens to treat the flag with respect, this interest did not justify the criminal prosecution of a man who burned the flag as part of a political protest.
A better way to encourage respect for the American flag would be to persuade people to recognize its unique symbolic value. The justices urged that there is “no more appropriate response to burning a flag than waving one’s own, no better way to counter a flag burner’s message than by saluting the flag that burns, no surer means of preserving the dignity even of the flag that burned than by ... according its remains a respectful burial.” The Court concluded that “we do not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents.”
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the special place the flag holds as the “visible symbol embodying our nation,” noting that “millions and millions of Americans regard it with an almost mystical reverence.” Because of its unique position, Rehnquist concluded that it was constitutionally permissible to prohibit burning the flag as a means of symbolic expression. He argued that Texas’s prohibition on flag burning did not regulate the content of Johnson’s message, but only removed one of the ways in which this message could be expressed. Johnson was left with “a full panoply of other symbols and every conceivable form of verbal expression” to convey his message. A ban on flag burning is thus consistent with the First Amendment, Justice Rehnquist concluded, because it is not directed at suppressing particular ideas, but rather seeks only to protect the special significance of the flag as the symbol of the United States.
4. New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985)
The Supreme Court decided that the search did not violate the Constitution and established more lenient standards for reasonableness in school searches.
The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to public school officials because they act under the authority of the state. In addition students have a reasonable expectation of privacy for the property they bring with them to school. They have not “waived all rights to privacy in such items merely by bringing them onto school grounds.”
However, the justices said the privacy interest of students must be balanced against the interest of teachers and school officials in maintaining order and discipline in school. Trying to achieve a balance between these interests, the Supreme Court ruled that school officials should not be required to obtain a warrant to conduct a search of a student suspected of breaking school rules because this would “unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.”
The Court decided that schools officials do not need to have probable cause to believe that a student has violated school rules in order to initiate a search, even though probable cause is required for police to initiate a search of children or adults outside of school. Instead, school officials are only required to have a “reasonable suspicion” that a student has violated school rules in order to search that student. A search will be deemed reasonable if, when it is started, “there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated … either the law or the rules of the school.” In addition, the scope of the search must be “reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” The Court concluded that “the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.”
Applying this standard to T.L.O., the Court ruled that the search was reasonable. It was reasonable for the vice principal to believe that T.L.O. had been smoking in the bathroom in violation of school rules because a teacher witnessed it. Thus the vice principal had adequate grounds to search T.L.O.’s purse for cigarettes. While doing so, he came across evidence suggesting that T.L.O. was selling marijuana in the school. This gave him grounds to search the rest of her purse for drugs.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan first argued that the same probable cause standard that is applied outside of schools should be applied inside schools. The Fourth Amendment states that “the right of the people to be secure … against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.” According to Justice Brennan’s interpretation, the Fourth Amendment explains what it means by “unreasonable” by specifying that “no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause.” Thus, searches that take place without probable cause, including those based only on “reasonable suspicion,” are unreasonable, and violate the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Stevens also dissented. Like Justice Brennan, he believed that the Court’s new standard of “reasonable suspicion” was inappropriate. Instead of allowing school officials to search a student based on the reasonable suspicion that the student was breaking a school rule, Justice Stevens would require that the student be suspected of “violating the law or engaging in conduct that is seriously disruptive of school order, or the educational process.” Smoking in the bathroom was not a “violent or disruptive activity,” he argued, so an immediate search was unnecessary.
WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN? Personal Rights – Equal Protection, Due Process
1. Korematsu v. United States (1944)
After Pearl Harbor was bombed in December 1941, the military feared a Japanese attack on the U.S. mainland and the American government was worried that Americans of Japanese descent might aid the enemy. In 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed an executive order forcing many West Coast Japanese and Japanese Americans into internment camps. Fred Korematsu, a Japanese American, relocated and claimed to be Mexican-American to avoid being interned, but was later arrested and convicted of violating an executive order. Korematsu challenged his conviction in the courts saying that Congress, the President, and the military authorities did not have the power to issue the relocation orders and that he was being discriminated against based on his race. The government argued that the evacuation was necessary to protect the country and the federal appeals court agreed. Korematsu appealed this decision and the case came before the U.S. Supreme Court.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
2. Mapp v. Ohio (1961)
Suspicious that Dollree Mapp might be hiding a person suspected in a bombing, the police went to her home in Cleveland, Ohio. They knocked on her door and demanded entrance, but Mapp refused to let them in because they did not have a warrant. After observing her house for several hours, the police forced their way into Mapp's house, holding up a piece of paper when Mapp demanded to see their search warrant. As a result of their search, the police found a trunk containing pornographic materials. They arrested Mapp and charged her with violating an Ohio law against the possession of obscene materials. At the trial the police officers did not show Mapp and her attorney the alleged search warrant or explain why they refused to do so. Nevertheless, the court found Mapp guilty and sentenced her to jail. After losing an appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, Mapp took her case to the U.S. Supreme Court.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
3. Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)
In June 1961, a burglary occurred at the Bay Harbor Pool Room in Panama City, FL. Police arrested Clarence Earl Gideon after he was found nearby with a pint of wine and some change in his pockets. Gideon, who could not afford a lawyer, asked a Florida Circuit Court judge to appoint one for him arguing that the Sixth Amendment entitles everyone to a lawyer. The judge denied his request and Gideon was left to represent himself. He did a poor job of defending himself and was found guilty of breaking and entering and petty larceny. While serving his sentence in a Florida state prison, Gideon began studying law, which reaffirmed his belief his rights were violated when the Florida Circuit Court refused his request for counsel. From his prison cell, he handwrote a petition asking the U.S. Supreme Court to hear his case and it agreed.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
4. Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
Ernesto Miranda was arrested after a crime victim identified him, but police officers questioning him did not inform him of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, or of his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of an attorney. While he confessed to the crime, his attorney later argued that his confession should have been excluded from trial.
What do you think should have happened?
What actually happened?
What actually happened?
1. Korematsu v. United States (1944)
The Court agreed with government and stated that the need to protect the country was a greater priority than the individual rights of the Japanese and Japanese Americans.
2. Mapp v. Ohio (1961)
The Court determined that evidence obtained through a search that violates the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in state courts.
In a 5-3 decision,* the Court ruled in favor of Mapp. The majority opinion, written by Justice Clark, applied the exclusionary rule to the states. That rule requires courts to exclude from criminal trials evidence that was obtained in violation of the constitution’s ban on unreasonable searches and arrests. Justice Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion. The majority opinion was based on several earlier decisions that had begun the process of applying federal constitutional protections to state criminal justice systems.
In one of those earlier decisions, the Supreme Court had ruled that the states must be bound by the Fourth Amendment because its guarantees were part of the “due process of law” required of states by the Fourteenth Amendment. That decision essentially required the Fourth Amendment’s provisions, which previously had only applied to the federal government, to apply to the states as well. The justices ruled that since the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment applied to both the federal and state governments, they should be enforced the same way in both federal and state courts. Evidence obtained unlawfully is not admissible in federal court, so it should not be admissible in state courts either.
In his dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the majority had confronted the wrong issue in its decision. Because Ms. Mapp was convicted under an Ohio statute criminalizing the possession of obscene material, Justice Harlan believed that the “new and pivotal issue” was whether this statute “is consistent with the rights of free thought and expression assured against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Thus, he concluded that the majority had ignored the principles of judicial restraint and stare decisis, and had “’reached out’” to consider the exclusionary rule issue. According to Justice Harlan, this was a First Amendment case and not an appropriate case for extending the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule to the states. He also concluded that it was wrong to impose the exclusionary rule, designed for the federal criminal process, on the states which, in his view, bore quite different responsibilities in this area of law.
3. Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)
The Court unanimously ruled in Gideon’s favor, stating that the Six Amendment requires state courts to provide attorneys for criminal defendants who cannot otherwise afford counsel.
The Court said that the best proof that the right to counsel was fundamental and essential was that “[g]overnments … spend vast sums of money to … try defendants accused of crime … Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime[s]… who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses.” This indicated that both the government and defendants considered the aid of a lawyer in criminal cases absolutely necessary. In addition, the opinion noted that the Constitution places great emphasis on procedural safeguards designed to guarantee that defendants get fair trials. According to the opinion, “this noble idea cannot be realized if the poor man charged with a crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.” The Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a right to counsel was fundamental and essential to a fair trial in both state and federal criminal justice systems. In all felony criminal cases, states must provide lawyers for indigent defendants.
4. Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
The Supreme Court agreed, deciding that the police had not taken proper steps to inform Miranda of his rights.
In their majority opinion, the justices explained that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is fundamental to our system of justice, and is “one of our Nation’s most cherished principles.” This guarantee requires that only statements freely made by a defendant may be used in court. The justices described some of the techniques used by police officers in interrogations. They observed that “the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented,” and cited the advantage police officers hold in custodial interrogations (interrogations that take place while the subject is in police custody). Because of these advantages, they concluded that “the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty, and trades on the weakness of individuals.”
The Court ruled that in order to reconcile the necessary practice of custodial interrogations with the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, police must ensure that defendants are aware of their rights before they are interrogated in custody. Because the right against self-incrimination is so important to our system of justice, a case by case determination made by police officers of whether each defendant understands his or her rights is not sufficient. Before interrogating defendants in police custody, they must be warned 1) that they have the right to remain silent 2) that anything they say may be used against them in court, 3) that they have the right to an attorney, either retained by them or appointed by the court, and 4) that they may waive these rights, but they retain the right to ask for an attorney any time during the interrogation, at which point the interrogation can only continue in the presence of a lawyer.
The Supreme Court reasoned that because the right against self-incrimination is so fundamental, and because it is so simple to inform defendants of their rights, any statements made by defendants during a custodial interrogation in which the defendant has not been read his “Miranda rights” are inadmissible in both state and federal courts.
Justice Harlan wrote the main dissent. He argued that the newly created rules did not protect against police brutality, coercion or other abuses of authority during custodial interrogations because officers willing to use such illegal tactics and deny their use in court were “equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about warnings and waivers.” Instead, he predicted that the new requirements would impair and substantially frustrate police officers in the use of techniques that had long been considered appropriate and even necessary, thus reducing the number of confessions police would be able to obtain. He concluded that the harmful effects of crime on society were “too great to call the new rules anything but a hazardous experimentation.”
A student is moved into a special program at a different school based on his ethnicity.
A student is denied entrance to the school of her choice based on her ethnicity.
A college asks students to identify their ethnicity on their application forms.
A school principal confiscates a student’s phone. Later, suspecting that the student may have been involved in illegal activities at school, the principal reads the students’ texts.
A media teacher pulls an advertisement from the morning announcements, worried that the message of the advertisement may be too sensitive or inappropriate for freshmen.
Several students wear
Middle-Eastern men are captured by American soldiers, transferred to an American prison, and held as possible terrorist suspects.
The police obtain a search warrant for a suspected illegal cell phone seller’s home for stolen property. The police do not find any cell phones, but while searching the home the police discover evidence of an illegal drug operation.
A police officer begins asking questions of a suspect immediately after arrest.